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OCAKLIK TIMARS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ★

I

A BRIEF REVIEW OF YUGOSLAV HISTORICAL LITERATURE
DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM

I have already touched upon the question of *ocaklik timars* elsewhere¹ and found that as far as I know nothing has hitherto been written about it in Yugoslav historical science. This is not an accidental fact. There are several fundamental reasons for it. Obviously, the historical-political position of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the moment it became a part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire up to the time that preceded the Second World War must be given primary importance among those reasons. That period of time coincides with the foundation and the development of historiography as a modern bourgeois science in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not only was historiography at that time in its initial stage of development as a systematic working process but it was also handicapped by numerous social, national, ideological and moral prejudices both of the past and of the time in which it was born and in which two significant epochs in the life of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina were rapidly succeeding one another.

In the available historical sources there is not a single datum showing that the estates of the Moslem nobility in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been inherited from the pre-Ottoman period and that they were preserved as such till the end of Turkish rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Neither foreign nor Yugoslav historians who have dealt with the problem have succeeded in producing conclusive scientific evidence that during Turkish rule the Bosnian and Herzegovinian feudal lords were descendants of the ancient Bogomil nobility and in full possession of their landed estates.

★ For want of an adequate English translation the original Turkish words will be kept when necessary. *They will be printed in italics.*

¹ "Pregled" (Survey) for 1953, No. 2 and 5.

These estates were supposedly inherited from their ancestors and left by the Turkish authorities in possession of their original status with all the original rights and privileges.² It stands to reason that the theories of all these numerous researches into the problem do not conform to one another either in content or in form. But divergence they do oscillate with greater or less degree of divergence round the above mentioned formulation, save for some exceptions which belong to the newer phase of Yugoslav historiography. These exceptions are represented by authors who attempted to advance the question, by means of new scientific approaches, either by the process of wider and more versatile research into the Turkish sources or by more daring criticism of the old conceptions. In fact, the above opinions, essentially conservative, frequently romantic, often politically and socially calculated for the purpose of mystification and false presentation, expressed, or rather reflected the entire rich scale of historic changes in the mentioned period of the development of Yugoslav historiography, all the complexity of social, national and political problems and conflicts with which the time was burdened. If we want to simplify the basic social and political forces that during the Austro-Hungarian occupation were the factors that had their representatives in historical science, we can sort them out in the following way: first, the Moslem feudal nobility with Moslem peasantry and trade plebeian masses; second, the masses of feudal serfs nationally and politically united to the middle class; and third, the foreign authorities basing and building up their political power on the contrasts and contradictions in the invaded Bosnia and Herzegovina. That complex was framed by the wider problems of Austrian imperialistic expansion in the Balkans and the problem of the liberation and union of the South Slavs. This constellation, of course, was imbued with moments of national and revolutionary reality, which gave great strength and tension to the whole situation.

² The attitude of some contemporary Turkish historians is characteristic in this respect. When discussing either the general problems of Ottoman feudalism or its concrete problems they refer to Ćiro Truhelka's views on the development of Ottoman feudalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, emphasizing just those views of his that are relevant to the origin and the position of the Moslem nobility in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, for example Halil Inalcik, D. Ph professor at the Faculty of philology, history and geography in Ankara in his paper "From Stefan Dušan to the Ottoman Empire" refers to Ćiro Truhelka in order to strengthen one of the basic postulates of his paper. i.e. that the Turkish authorities left the social system and classes in the invaded countries untouched. Prof. Inalcik, relying on the oldest cadastre *defters*, identifies, as regards the nature and the quality of the disposal and obligations, the heritages and *çifliks* held by Christian gentry in Bosnia where the tithe and taxes, were compulsory duties, with *mulk* – *timars* in Anatolia. The Anatolian *mulk* – *timars*, i.e. the *timars* privately owned by feudal families on condition they went on campaign, in fact signify a compromise of the regime of *miri* land and the private ownership of land, or, in other words, a retreat from the principle of *miri* land. The mentioned heritages and *çifliks*, however, do not mean a retreat from that category. Those estates were indebted with the tithe and other duties, and, as

From this point of view the claims of Safet-bey Bašagić, who appears to be an unmistakable representative of the class of beys — the land-owners who do their best to defend their estates and privileges won during Ottoman rule and who try very hard to give these the aspect of a firm historic tradition, historic-legal legitimacy and the seal of immaculateness, are very interesting. Bašagić's articles published in his "Mirror" excite particular interest in this respect. These articles deal with the problem of the Moslem nobility, agrarian conditions, the position of the feudal lords and the plebs in Bosnia and Herzegovina etc. They are an attempt at scientific research and argumentation mixed with the desperate polemic of a nobleman — a bey, who, by any means, wants to prove the right of his class to press their landed estates and to use the serfs' labour. In the first issue of the "Mirror", which was published for several months during 1907, he explicitly admits that the paper was started in the defence of the beys' interests, which in spite of the conservative and opportunistic policy of the government in Bosnia and Herzegovina were more and more threatened by social and political developments in those provinces.³

Ciro Truhelka's views of the problem of the Moslem nobility are consistent with the attitude of Safet-bey Bašagić. Being a broad — minded scientist and more earnest and more versatile than Safet—bey Bašagić, Truhelka made an important contribution to research into the Ottoman period of Yugoslav history by his miscellaneous works on Ottoman feudalism in general and in particular on Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴ But all his works, and especially those dealing with agrarian-legal relations, are directed at the same erroneous and conservative conclusions that in his very direct way Safet-bey Bašagić came to with a lot of rude straightforwardness. In fact, many of Ćiro Truhelka's conclusions contradict his fundamental attitude towards the origin, the position and the importance of the Bosnian nobility and their estates. The very fact that he recognizes the regime of *miri* land in Bosnia and Herzegovina and establishes the absolute

regards family inheritance in a larger sense, were subject to the principle of deed, i.e. the payment of conveyance taxes to the *timar* owner or the *has* owner within whose limits they stood. All Moslem and some of Christian *çiftliks* in Bosnia and Herzegovina were subject to such a regime. In the course of the 16th and 17th centuries they increased in number so much that they started, by the wealth of their owners, to undermine and threaten the *timar* system.

³ "Ogledalo" (Ibret), Sarajevo, May 31 to August 23, 1907.

⁴ Ćiro Truhelka's article "The historical basis of the agrarian problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina" is his fundamental paper on this question. (The Herald of the Regional Museum in Sarajevo, XXVII 1915). The paper aims at giving a meritorious judgement on a rather complex question. The author did not succeed, however, in extenuating the contradictions of his explication. They become especially explicit when his interpretation of the principles of the Ottoman agrarian system is contrasted with his assertions that the status of the old Bosnian Bogomil nobility was almost unchanged when taken over by the new Ottoman social system.

administrative and legal power of the state sovereignty and the deprivation of Bosnian aristocrats — spahis and zeims — disproves his basic postulates in this respect. His treatise "Die geschichtliche Grundlage der bosnischen Agrarfrage", which was published in 1911, a time when the free ransom of feudal serfs was under discussion, is typical in this respect. Here the Austrian Hofrat Truhelka refers to Safet-bey Bašagić, Landtagspresident of the time, and his "Mirror" articles. Ćiro Truhelka supported the interests of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina was based, inter alia, on preventing a national liberation struggle and social and political progress, and to whom the alliance with Moslem Bosnian aristocrats was of importance. The same line of pro-Austrian interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina was also followed by numerous historians and lawyers in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. No matter how useful the alliance with the Moslem nobility was to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy from the point of view of immediate political interest, the open agrarian question, which was a strong social motive in the national resistance to the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, remained a great problem. This was particularly reflected in the works of Eduard Eichler: "Das Justizwesen Bosniens und der Hercegovina", published in Vienna in 1889, and Karlo Grunberg: "Agrarverfassung und das Grundentlastungsproblem in Bosnien und der Herzegowina", published in Leipzig in 1911. We take these two authors as examples because they both agreed with Truhelka in the basic manner of treating the problem of the Bosnian noblemen and their estates, one of them as Truhelka's predecessor, the other as his contemporary. On the basis of their premises of *miri* land, Turkish judiciary and administration all three of them come to the illogical conclusion of hereditary ownership, i.e. of the full right of the Bosnian nobility to possess land, and of their privileges having remained untouched during Ottoman rule, etc.

Beginning with Safet-bey Bašagić, they all refer to the outstanding Serbian historian Stojan Novaković. Several works of this gifted historian deal with the basic problem of feudalism in the Yugoslav provinces. Without any knowledge of the Turkish language, relying upon second-hand and third-hand information and using his great knowledge of South Slav social and political institutions from the pre-Ottoman period, he tried to make several scientific syntheses, which, although making a considerable contribution to Yugoslav historical science of that time, contain a considerable number of serious historic errors. The example of this historian obviously shows that the solution of major scientific problems requires a definite level of scientific discipline. But, in my opinion, Stojan Novaković's error in his consideration of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian aristocrats and their landed estates reflects two things.

1. The political and social orientation of the forces that Stojan Novaković, as the minister in the Serbian government, represented just at the

time when the political, social and national problems of Bosnia and Herzegovina were in the focus of the struggle of our peoples as well as in the focus of the two independent states — Serbia and Montenegro.

2. The works of Stojan Novaković as well as those of all other researchers into the Turkish Empire are influenced by Josef Hammer who with his monumental work "The History of the Turkish Empire" laid the foundation of the study of the history of the Ottoman Empire in the form of a synthesis of eastern and western historical sources. Hammer, who himself was a contemporary and an eyewitness of the immense and anarchic power of the Moslem Bosnian aristocrats towards the end of Turkish rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was disposed to look for the roots of their wealth, power and standing in the ancient past preceding Turkish times, by making an analogy with the beys of some Kurdish tribes in Asia Minor. Creating for the first time in European historiography a monumental scientific synthesis of the history of the Ottoman Empire, Hammer was not able, however, in spite of his great talent and unexampled diligence to produce a more reliable and more detailed study of the peculiarities of all the different provinces of the Turkish Empire, firstly, because of the extensiveness of the matter he inquired into, and secondly, because of the condition of historical science in the Turkish Empire. Yet, Hammer's influence and significance did not wane even after the appearance of Zinkeisen, Jorg, Gibbons and other great historians, who also inquired into the history of the Ottoman Empire.

Research into the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish rule continued in pre-war Yugoslavia. Besides Ćiro Truhelka, two eminent historians — researchers into the Turkish period — distinguish themselves by their very useful and original works. They were Hamdija Kreševljaković and Vladislav Skarić. Hamdija Kreševljaković, by examining the history of Bosnian towns and captaincies, provides considerable material for solving the problem of the Bosnian aristocrats and their power under Turkish rule.⁵ Moreover, some of his other works abound in documentation valuable not only for the history of material culture and economic activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Ottoman rule, but which, by being very detailed, give useful information about the nature and significance of the Moslem feudal class.

⁵ Among the works of this author that contribute to the solution of the problem are in the first place: his detailed study "Captaincies in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Sarajevo 1954; "Captaincies and Captains in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Almanac of the Historical Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, vol II, 1950); "Dženetići — a contribution to the study of feudalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina" ("Works", the annual of the Scientific Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, vol. II 1954); "Towers and *Ocaks* in B and H (Almanac of the Regional Institute for the protection of cultural monuments and natural rarities of B and H, vol. II 1954); and in the same Almanac, "Ancient Herzegovinian Towns" (together with H. Kapidžić).

In both his treatment and personal attitude towards the main problems of Ottoman feudalism in Bosnia, Skarić represents, amongst the historians of his time, a phenomenon which stands out from all others by his inferences about the Turkish feudal system in Bosnia. His viewpoints do not result only from his social and national orientation but from his serious analysis of the Turkish sources, as well. From his work it follows that from the very beginning Turkish feudalism in Bosnia was organized, in principle, in the same way as it was in other parts of the Empire, which implies the assumption that the solution of the question of the inheritability of the estates of Moslem Bosnian aristocrats should be looked for in the times following the 16th century. We come to such a conclusion on the basis of two things:

1. Some quite daring assumptions of his as well as his conclusions concerning "čiflučenje".⁶

2. The care with which he studied the sources on the *timar* organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, his "Register of Bosnian Spahis from 1711"⁷ shows that he did not make a very successful step towards the solution of the problem of the time in which *timars* and *zemets* became hereditary estates. The introduction to the edited register and the comment on it contain a number of open questions and surprises, which shows that Skarić was far from guessing that behind all this lay hidden the institution of the *ocaklik timar* (the hereditary feudal fee) which remained in the possession of spahi families and was shared among the members of the family according to definite rules and standards. The misinterpretation of the expression "tahvil"^{7a} kept him from discovering that behind the precious material of the mentioned register lay the institution of the *ocaklik timar* and its illustrations and thus hindered him from drawing very useful conclusions.

It is characteristic of Hamdija Kreševljaković's and Vladislav Skarić's scientific work that its interest and power originate in and contribute to scientific problems to which they were devoted with the zeal of researchers. Therefore, the unavoidable influence of the social background to which they belonged is reflected in their works only in complicated and indirect ways. It is different with some other researchers and publicists who have dealt with the history of Turkish feudalism in our provinces, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such is the case of Momčilo Ninčić, for

⁶ Thus, without having insight into the information available from the cadastre *defters* of the Government Presidency Archives in Istanbul, contrary to many Yugoslav historians he ascertained that the beginning of "čiflučenje" should be placed into a considerably earlier period. According to him that process started in the first half of the 16th century. The latest research confirms his assumption.

⁷ Herald of the Regional Museum in Sarajevo, XLII, 1930.

^{7a} See: Nedim Filipović "On the expression 'Tahvil'" Contributions to Oriental Philology and the History of the Yugoslav peoples under Turkish rule, Vol. II, 1951.

example, who in 1920 published his "History of Agrarian-Legal Relations of the Serbian Peasantry under the Turks".⁸ His opinion on the Turkish *timar* system is not the result of his own research into authentic documents but rather a clever compilation of opinions and information gathered secondhand. This work of his was written for political reasons and it is not by chance that it was published in the year 1920. It should be mentioned parenthetically that the starting point of his work is the conception that the Turkish social system was not proper feudalism at all, a conception which prevented some other Yugoslav authors from having a proper approach to the treatment of the main problems of that system.⁹ It should be pointed out that when discussing Turkish noblemen Ninčić maintains incidentally that at the time of the decline of governmental centralism they had their *timars* in family ownership, but he does not present the theory in the form of a worked out and well analysed assumption from which he could draw important concrete and historically flexible conclusions.¹⁰ For that reason this hint remains with Ninčić as well as with many of his predecessors and contemporaries only an incidental attitude which neither fecundates their efforts nor creates new starting points.

To sum up, researchers into the problem that we are interested in here have either followed the line of the old conception that the estates of the Moslem Bosnian aristocrats were hereditary feudal fees preserved from the pre-Ottoman period and that they should be dealt with as such, or they denied such assertions and refused to admit any peculiarities of the estates of Moslem Bosnian aristocrats in relation to the feudal estates of Turkish spahis and zeims in other provinces of the Turkish Empire. The latter considered that it was by plundering and extortion that Bosnian noblemen came into the possession of land at the time of anarchy in the Empire.¹¹

⁸ The same author treats the problem of land ownership under the Turks in "The problem of landownership in Serbia under the Turks", Beograd, 1903.

⁹ Such or similar opinions are supported by some contemporary Turkish historians. In their treatises on Ottoman feudalism the spahi is declared to be a civil servant, and the term "state land" is given such a meaning as if the state were an institution almost independent of society, of social class structure. The rent that the spahi is a holder of is taken to be his salary. Some Turkish historians are very cautious and often talk reservedly about the feudal system of the Ottoman Empire, if they discuss it at all. The classical West-European feudalism scheme, which cannot be applied to Ottoman feudalism, makes a number of those historians mix essence with form, sacrificing the inner logic of this organization, which is essentially feudal, to its outer display.

¹⁰ The value of those remarks can be best estimated from the chapter of his above mentioned work "Bosnia and Herzegovina" in which there are groundless and for modern historical science even naive assertions. (The cited paper, pp. 123-133).

¹¹ Such conceptions particularly found expression in the domain of political practice, notably at the time when the agrarian question was being solved in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In his study "The Origin of Moslem Aristocrats in Bosnia and Herzegovina"¹² Vaso Čubrilović, for the first time in our historiography, attacks the old conservative thesis that the estates belonging to the Bosnian and Herzegovinian nobility had been inherited from their pre-Ottoman ancestors and that they remained as such in their full legitimacy throughout the period of Turkish rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He does so by making a very successful analysis of the main stages in the genesis and formation of that nobility as well as by showing on the basis of the available data that the above mentioned assertion is simply a historical legend which disappears as soon as it is exposed to critical analysis. He comes to the conclusion that the origin of the hereditary estates of the Bosnian noblemen should be looked for in the last centuries of Turkish rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, although the most successful of such works in its time, Vaso Čubrilović's study only represents the most consistent part of the negative criticism of the prevailing opinion on the problem, whereas the positive part, the creative part of that criticism is laid down more in its full sharpness. When the *timars* and *zeamets* passed into family inheritance, or more exactly, whether it ever happened and if so, whether it had been done with the effect of reconciling the interests of the class of Bosnian aristocrats and the central authority of the Ottoman state, and in what ways it affected the further development of agrarian relations and the development of social relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina — all this was still an open question. In other words the question was whether Bosnian aristocrats had seized the land only by way of "čiflučenje", which was more or less legalized in the Ottoman Empire or whether the process had taken place in accordance or disaccordance with changes in the organization of the *timar* system or whether it had paralleled the brutal, tyrannical extortion and seizure of *timars*. If it was done by force, it is questionable how the Ottoman authority, which was still powerful enough to prevent obvious and full anarchy, could put up with it. The further question that arises is whether such a seizure was supposed to be a permanent aspect of possessing *timars* in the later centuries of Turkish feudalism in Bosnia. Brutal physical force might have been only a mask for a certain economic potential that used that force. This opens the question of the nature of that economic potential and about the deeper inner logic of the whole process.

¹² Yugoslav historical periodical, an. I, vol. 1—4, p. 368—400.

II

THE TIMAR SYSTEM IN BOSNIA BY THE END
OF THE 16th CENTURY

In order to answer the question it will be necessary, on the basis of the data available from the oldest cadastres of the Government Presidency in Istanbul, to give a brief outline of the development of agrarian relations from the Turkish conquest up to the moment when changes in the inheriting of *timars* took place with the consent and approval of the central authority of the Ottoman Empire. Those data clearly show that the conquerors used to introduce *arazi miri* as a predominant manner of land ownership in all the conquered provinces of the Balkan peninsula, and consequently, in Bosnia too. This basic idea in economic policy matched the abolition of the feudal class and its inheritable domains in the social and political fields. The Turkish feudal system accepted gentry. But their estates were not left untouched, either. By allotting *timars* and *zeamets* to the Islamized and non-Islamized representatives of the gentry they meant to suppress the class consciousness of aristocrats of their unlimited ownership of the land.¹³ The two oldest Bosnian *defters* from the second half of the 15th century, whose data I have partly reported, as well as the oldest Herzegovinian *defter*, written before the occupation of Herzegovina was fully completed, bear witness to the fact that as early as that century the category of *miri* land was firmly established in those provinces.¹⁴ The references made by Bašagić, Truhelka, Novaković and others to the heritages and ancient *çifliks* as evidence in support of their theory that the privately owned landed estates of Bosnian and Herzegovinian nobility continued in their possession under Turkish rule, cannot be taken for granted. They disregard the fundamental change that took place in the treatment of the private ownership of land, which was the establishment of the category of *miri* land. From the above mentioned oldest Bosnian and Herzegovinian *defters* it can be seen that new *spahis* and *zeims* were explicitly permitted to keep in their possession the *çifliks* and heritages given to them together with *timars*, or more precisely within *timars*, even if they

¹³ Innumerable preserved cadastres for Bosnia and Herzegovina kept in the Government presidency Archives in Istanbul offer detailed data on this. The two oldest *defters* of the Bosnian (Nos. 18 and 24) and the oldest of the Herzegovinian *Sancak* (No. 5 m) which come down from the last decades of the 15th century and a whole series of 16th century *defters* relating to the Bosnian, Herzegovinian, Zvornički, Kliški and Začazman-ski *Sancaks* enable us to follow the problem in its full historical concreteness. The author of this work has made an analysis of these *defters*. Its results will be presented in his study "The development of the *timar* system in Bosnia and Herzegovina".

¹⁴ Nedim Filipović, A View of Ottoman Feudalism (Annual of the Historical Society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, y. IV. 1952, pp. 5–146).

lost their *timars* or were given another one. This was so provided they paid the tithe and other duties to the new owners of such *timars* within which their heritages and *çifliks* stood. From this it is obvious that unlimited ownership of land and the consequent prerogatives were out of the question.¹⁵ On the other hand it could not be a matter of large properties, since such estates and *çifliks* were only small parts of *timars* and *zeamets*. The assertion of Safet-bey Bašagić, made on the basis of a Turkish text available to him, that from the very conquest of the country Moslem Bosnian noblemen gave, at their explicit request, their children to *acemi oğlans*¹⁶ does not lead to the conclusion that this was evidence of the preserved privileges of the Bosnian nobility, i.e. of the preserved estates which served as a substantial basis for such privileges, even if we accept this together with the literally presented Turkish text without any critical analysis. Concerning this assertion of Bašagić's, it is only possible for us to say, on the basis of the data found in the Bitola *sicils* and of some Turkish data published in Bulgaria, that Bosnian and Herzegovinian Moslems gave their children to *acemi oğlans* in the 17th century.

The mentioned *defters* prove that outstanding vlach headmen, too, were admitted into the Turkish feudal system. But, as we have already pointed out elsewhere, the *timars* and *zeamets* of those vlach chiefs were not permanently left in the possession of their families, but changed owners just as was the case with other feudal fees in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to this it is notable that even the territories populated by vlachs, which either partially or completely formed part of the *timars* and *zeamets* of their headmen, passed into possession of other spahis together with those *timars* and *zeamets*, regardless of the faith of the new spahis. The same applied to their heritages and *çifliks*, which did not necessarily have to remain within the *timars* of vlach headmen. They might have been parts of somebody else's *timars* and *zeamets* in which case vlach chiefs paid the owner of the *timar* the corresponding rent incomes.

Apparently, by admitting the old feudal gentry and vlach headmen into the *timar* system, the Turkish government aimed at using their military potential as well as their moral and political standing in stabilizing its domination over the invaded provinces as quickly and firmly as possible. Once well established and stabilized, the enormous political and economical power of the Moslem Ottoman Empire considered it no longer necessary to pay any exceptional attention to the Bosnian ex-gentry, so that they started to be more and more dependent on the new Moslem authori-

¹⁵ Nedim Filipović, the mentioned paper; in this connection there are very interesting data which are presented, on the basis of the oldest cadastres for Albany, by Prof. Halil Inalcik in his already mentioned study "From Stefan Dušan to the Ottoman Empire".

¹⁶ Safet-bey Bašagić, A Brief Introduction to the Past of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1463 – 1850, Sarajevo, 1900, p. 19

ty both in the economic – social and the moral–political sense.¹⁷ The more the relationship between feudal lords and peasantry changed, the less the former, in the eye of the latter, represented the class capable of attracting the consideration of the Ottoman Empire by its social and political authority. On the contrary, they were more and more considered by *rayah*, i.e. by non-Moslem peasant subjects, as a class of people who had been given the rights to their feudal rents exclusively by the grace of the sultan. No wonder then that a great majority of Christian *spahis* became islamized in order to break the last moral links with the past, from which they had drawn a certain reputation at the time of the conquest and afterwards. Kuripešić's report, often referred to, that the sultan urged the Bosnian *spahis* to campaign in Hungary in order to acquire new fiefs there and that they were threatened in case of disobedience with disgrace and reduction to the status of common subjects, elucidates very clearly the position of the Bosnian *spahis* and proves how wrong those historians are who maintain that the Bosnian gentry preserved full rights over their estates throughout the Turkish rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁸

Further, there is another interesting phenomenon that strikes the eye of the reader of the 16th century cadastres of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, instead of islamized Christian *spahis* an ever increasing number of vlach headmen turn up as the holders of feuds. However, it goes without saying that there was a certain difference between 16th and 17th century vlach knezes and 15th century vlach headmen. Whereas the latter were in a position to have large *timars* and even *zeamets*, the feudal fees of the vlach knezes of the 16th and 17th centuries, were, for the most part, only small feuds.¹⁹ It seems to me that this phenomenon can be explained by the changes that took place in the social organization of vlach in the course of the 16th and 17th centuries. In the 15th century they very often represented large nomadic communities whose transformation into a settled population was more or less slow, whereas the 16th and the 17th centuries are characterized by a swift territorialization of the vlach population. That tumultuous proces of the 16th and 17th centuries broke the large vlach communities into small but compact territorial units, in

¹⁷ The decrees issued by Süleyman the Legislator on the *has* land in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the decrees by which *çifliks* with *mukat* had to be turned into *çifliks* with tithe and dues and thus to become a part of *timars* serve to confirm the above. The decrees were issued shortly after the Mohaç victory, after which the Ottomans started rapidly and considerably to expand their domination over Pannonia. The cadastres for B and H of the time offer very valuable data in this respect.

¹⁸ The Journey, B. Krupišić, Rad, vol. 56, p. 175.

¹⁹ In some *defters* containing *kanunnames* the register is preceded by a text which emphasizes the part and importance of knezes and indicates the proportions of their *timars*. The data available from a published *kanunname* of Zvornički *sancak* are very characteristic in this regard. (See: Nedim Filipović, A *Kanunname* of Zvornički *Sancak*, Herald of the Regional Museum in Sarajevo, 1948, pp. 223–234).

which the power and reputation of the knez, grown out of the ancient tribal relationship, continued to be apparent, also, in the new conditions of stable territorial organization. The Ottoman Empire needed that power and that reputation for the consolidation of its authority, and for the proper functioning of its fiscal, administrative and legal services. Besides, the knezes took part in campaigns and thus strengthened the military force of the Turkish Empire.²⁰ This paper is not the place to discuss the internal structure of the knezes' *timars*, the institution of *rataja* and other interesting phenomena on those *timars*, which point out interesting aspects of the internal process that accompanied the territorialization of the vlach. But as it relates to my topic it is important to mention here that the 16th century *defters* relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina show that even the *timars* of the knezes — which were usually populated by vlach led by those knezes — did not always remain in the possession of knezes' families, although the title of knez was hereditary. From a *defter* originating from the last years of Suleyman's rule it can be seen that those *timars* passed into the possession of Moslem spahis and started being a part of larger *timars*, too, whereas knezes and their heirs were left landless.²¹ All this was happening, of course, in the epoch of the first serious disorders in the *timar* organization of the Turkish Empire. But it is necessary to point out something else here. Namely, in many cases knezes' *çifliks* stood within their *timars* and sometimes were so large that they fully corresponded to those *timars*. When a knez would lose such a *timar* either because he refused to take part in a war, or because he renounced his right over it, or for any other reason, the *çiflik* would remain in his possession, but he would pay the corresponding rent for it to the new owner. Consequently, their heritages and *çifliks* were far from representing the unlimited private ownership free of any rent. This means that even in such cases the *miri* land was the basis which gave character to all the different external aspects of possessing land. The deprived knezes and their descendants were often given back their *timars* because of the importance of their services performed in collecting the rent for the feudal class and its state. This means that the social position of knezes and the respect they received from their peasant vlach population had to be taken into account by the Sublime Porte, which, nevertheless, did not recede from the fundamental social establishment, i.e. from *miri* land. There is another matter that should be explained in connection with the point of our interest. The fact that knezes' *timars* were small was in compliance with the tendency to keep them inheritable, because such inheritability contradicted neither the state's

²⁰ The cited *kanunname* of Zvornički *Sancak*, as well as the *Kanunname* of Sremski *Sancak* from the year 1588/9 which was published by Prof. D. Branislav Đurđev, Herald of the Regional Museum in Sarajevo, 1948, pp. 269–284.

²¹ See cadastral *defter*, No 529 in the "Government Presidency Archives in Istanbul.

interest nor the standards established in the *timar* organization with respect to inheritance.

That such general regulations on inheriting and using *timars* respectively were valid in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the same way as they were in the other provinces of the Empire is clearly seen from the 16th century *defters* relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina. These *defters* make it evident that fathers' properties were inherited by sons in certain proportions and under certain circumstances. The son was given a larger proportion of the *timar* if his father fell in the battle-field than if he died a natural death. The institution of *mazul*, i.e. of the deposed spahi who is in this or that way left without *timar* is fully valid in such cases, too. The *mazul* with a *bedel*, that is with a valid document indicating the amount of income he used to collect from the *timar* before he was dispossessed, had priority in getting a vacant *timar*. It is not the proper occasion here, of course, to make an analysis of the institution of *mazul* or to speak about all the different economic transactions and the abuses that may have been hidden behind it, and to what extent the bureaucracy, which even earlier by the sequential way of its development had shown signs of degeneration and corruption, was involved in all this. It is important to point out here that the great significance of *mazul* in Bosnia and Herzegovina is only a further proof of the degree to which the possession and inheritance of *timars* were uncertain in this province as well as in the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, the fact that vacant *timars* in Bosnia and Herzegovina were often put at the disposal of *mazuls* from other *eyalets* makes it obvious that it is completely groundless to speak of the privileged position of Bosnian spahis and zeims in the Turkish Empire. Our considerations are confirmed by all the *kanunnames* of the sancaks of the Bosnian *eyalet* that have been published so far in Yugoslavia as well as those published elsewhere.²²

However, in the very course of the development of the *timar* system in the 16th century degenerative changes, present in the other provinces of the Turkish Empire, were perceivable here, too. But in Bosnia and Herzegovina, owing to some especially complex circumstances, they could

²² Ömer Lutfi Barkan, *Kanunlar*, Istanbul, 1945, pp. 395–401; *kanunnames* published in Yugoslavia: Ćiro Truhelka, *The Old Turkish Agrarian legal code for Bosnia*, Herald of the Regional Museum in Sarajevo, XXVIII, 1916, pp. 427–475; Vladislav Skarić, *Turkish Agrarian Codes for the sancaks of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the year 1047*, Herald of the Regional Museum in Sarajevo, No. XLVIII, 1934, pp. 107 – ?; Branislav Đurđev, *Kanun-nama of the Bosnian Sancak from 1530*, Herald of the Regional Museum in Sarajevo, 1948, pp. 189–200; *Kanun-nama for the Bosnian, Herzegovinian and Zvornički Sancak*, from the year 1539, *Historical-legal code*, Sarajevo, 1950, vol. 3–4, pp. 227–240; Hamid Hadžibegić, *A Bosnian Kanunname from the year 1565*, Herald of the Regional Museum in Sarajevo, 1948, pp. 201–222. The mentioned *kanunnames* were all available to me.

and did result in different consequences. Before we proceed to explain some essential points of the development of the *timar* system in Bosnia and Herzegovina we would like to underline one phenomenon. The power of the Turkish military forces and the success of their campaigns were falling rapidly into a decline. The northern borders of the Empire were no longer advancing and this held back the expansion of the Turkish *timar* system, too. Attempts at shifting them towards Croatia were partly successful, but they revealed, in spite of the victories, the ever decreasing power of the Turkish military forces and the increasing significance of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its feudal class in preserving the Turkish frontiers and even in expanding them toward Croatia and the Venetian dominions in Dalmatia.

This retardation and arrest of the Turkish advance coinciding with many other unfavourable circumstances, made it very difficult towards the end of the 16th century for the feudal class to get new feuds or to enlarge the existing ones acquired either according to war merits or by grace of the sultan. In addition to this, the numerical increase of the Turkish military forces did not match their fighting power and morale, not to mention the fact that Turkey could not keep pace with Hungarian and Venetian armament. Among the documents kept in the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo there are some records from the end of the 16th century proving that deserving warriors and spahis had to wait for quite a long time to get a *timar* or receive a promotion.²³ It often happened that a brave warrior — spahi would accumulate up to 10 such promotions which would entitle him to the rank of *zeim*, but that he waited in vain to have his advancements realized. Such a situation diminished the prospects of advancement for feudal lords and destroyed their fighting morale. We must take into consideration that in the course of the 16th century the feudal class of Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed to a large extent to the Turkish victories in Pannonia and the Adriatic area and that in this epoch of the zenith of the power of the Ottoman Empire many people from Bosnia and Herzegovina distinguished themselves as grand viziers, province governors, army leaders and scientists, by which the close relations of this province with Istanbul as well as its significance for the Empire were fully justified. Therefore it is obvious that the lack of the fighting morale and enthusiasm which towards the end of the 16th century was felt not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but throughout the Empire, exposed this Turkish province, so strategically important to the Empire, to great danger and threatened to deprive the Empire of its considerable military power. The defeat suffered at Sisak in 1593 inflicted a particularly heavy blow on the Bosnian feudal class. That battle took the lives of the cream of that class.

²³ Documents No. 1788 and 3395 in the collection of documents of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo. Certain hints of this are found in *mühimme-defter*s from the end of the 16th century.

This process, although appearing only superficial, had a deep economic essence. In course of time the agrarian system based on the institution of *miri* land started affecting to an ever increasing extent not only its most powerful exterior organization — the *timar* system, but the whole Turkish economy, too. A certain economic stability achieved by the establishment of Ottoman rule over the Balkans and Pannonia was pregnant with sharp contradictions between the limited number of disposable feudal fees and the necessity of making the achieved level of production move at a good pace towards its improvement through surplus product. This could be done, however, only by abolishing the institution of *miri* land which proved more and more to be the main obstacle to further development. The economic negation of *miri* land required its political negation, which essentially meant the undermining of the substructure of the Empire. That contradiction which was strongly suppressed by the enormous power of the Ottoman Empire, steadily made its way forward as an economic necessity, resorting to all means that were forced on it by the whole situation. One of the basic forms of the manifestation of that necessity was the process which, for the want of a more adequate term, is labelled "čiflučenje". Appearing in a roundabout way, that process was destroying the system of *miri* land, although it was tacitly in both formal and legal compliance with it. It did not deny the validity of the outer framework of the *timar* and *has* systems. The spahi kept collecting the usual rent, but it was no longer only he who did so. Between the spahi and the rayah there was the intruder who had nothing to do with the *timar* organization or with agricultural production. That third person may have been a representative of the bureaucracy, a tradesman, a craftsman, a janissary etc. But placed in between the two sides, this new factor took over, as regards taxes, the role that the peasantry formerly played in relation to the spahi. To be sufficient both for the rent due to the spahi and the needs of the intermediary, the taxes were being steadily raised, which placed the peasantry in a very difficult position, because it was the peasant class that remained the main agricultural producer and the real rent supplier. Thus the rent, or better to say the surplus product was being divided between two persons, the spahi and the go-between. The consequence was that the surplus accumulated in agriculture frequently disappeared from agricultural production, assuming the form of capitalized money, that is to say, the form of commercial and usurious capital. No wonder then that at its full development the Ottoman Empire appeared more and more to be a typical empire of usurious, i.e. unproductive capital. In any case, vakifs played an important part in all this. For their part both commercial and usurious capital, and especially the latter, encountering the *miri* land as an unyielding obstacle, were destroying, by the power typical of it, the very backbone of the Turkish Empire — the *timar* system, establishing and reproducing conditions from which it had been acquired. By this we do not

mean that the representatives of the *timar* system did not take part in the process of „čiflučenje”. However, they did not participate in the process as spahis but as their own negation. The whole picture of the ”čiflučenje” corresponds to the nature of the economic power which was creating it. At least at first, while the central authority was still powerful, spahis could not take part in the process, nor did they do so on their *timars*, since it would have meant a flagrant conflict with the institution of *timar* organization. As we have said, the ”čiflučenje” created a sort of competition between all strata and classes of the Ottoman Empire in the distribution of the surplus product produced by the rayah class. That surplus was being fought for by several competitors: by the state which kept raising taxes and tributes; by merchants and craftsmen, in fact by the whole urban economy which disposed of commercial and usurious capital; by the bureaucracy at all levels which derived profit from that surplus by accepting bribes and by taking part in the ”čiflučenje”; and finally by the spahi who got his rent on the basis of very rigorous legal regulations. As a matter of course, all these elements became very often intertwined, but essentially they were all participants in a process which was taking place in the name of usurious and commercial capital. All sorts of violence, moral monstrosities, intrigues, defects and stresses were only the exterior, only various aspects of this deep economic essence. It goes without saying that the *timar* owner could participate in the struggle only as his own negation. The fact that a good deal of his income was to be spent on campaigns, the cost of living etc., which often got him into debt, forced him to participate in the above mentioned process. The limited inheritability of *timars* and the danger into which they had been brought by new circumstances were accompanied by numerous economic and moral factors which ever more rapidly weakened the *timar* organization and the fighting ability of the spahi.

In Yugoslav historical science, as far as I know, nobody has ever raised or discussed the following question: whether at the time of the decline of the *timar* system the Ottoman authorities took any measures to support the owners of *timars* and *zeamets* whose rent incomes, getting smaller and smaller, were insufficient to satisfy war costs and the costs of maintaining the spahi family. Further on we shall discuss the viewpoints of some outstanding Turkish experts and theoreticians concerning the reasons for which the *timar* organization fell into decay and all the different pieces of advice that were recommended for its recovery. It is notable that the old standards of collecting rent incomes from *timars* remained unchanged up to the end of the Turkish rule. The legal codifications of Mehmed the Conqueror, Süleyman and Ahmed the First left those standards as they had been at the beginning. The central administration strove to bring under control the frequent abuses of power and the tributes newly imposed upon the peasantry. But nowhere in those

codifications was the practice of "čiflučenje" attacked at its root. That process which was very significant in the Turkish economy was simply being hushed up. We cannot help wondering: for what reason? I am of the opinion that it was hardly possible for the Ottoman Empire to settle the problem of changing rent amounts. It involved enormous technical and administrative difficulties. The registration of rent incomes would have taken a lot of time and would have cost a great deal of money. The increasing of the rent income on the basis of higher rent rates could not stop the process of "čiflučenje" once it had started, mainly because of the character of *miri* land and the spahi's position therein. Any change would only have put the peasantry into a worse position, and ultimately the change meant the negation of the *timar* system and the *miri* land, since the increase in rent presumed a more definite, lasting and firm position of the spahi regarding inheritance and his participation in the economic organization of agriculture. Thus "čiflučenje" appeared to be an unavoidable prerogative of collecting the rent income and it is not surprising that rent amounts collected from peasants by *çiflik* owners varied from *çiflik* to *çiflik*. All this indicated that the rigorous standards of paying rent in kind were not enough to control the system of agricultural production and that the Ottoman administration had to admit a natural regulator. Some outward measures taken by the Ottomans to help the spahi at the time when the *timar* system was entering on a crisis are not very relevant here. Thus, according to the Bitola *sicils*, there was a tendency to enlarge *timars* in order to provide spahis with at least a minimum income. The result was the decrease in the number of spahis and the merger of small *timars* into larger ones. In order to make it possible for impoverished spahis to take part in campaigns, they would be lent the money from the state treasury. In long wars, such as the Candiotte war a certain number of spahis were exempted from military duties in order to be able to go to the *timars* of their fellow-spahis to collect on their behalf the rent so badly needed for the campaign and the maintenance of their families. But neither these nor other measures could save the *timar* organization from further decay.

I have discussed elsewhere the *çifliks* in Bosnia that are mentioned in the oldest Bosnian *defters*. Those *çifliks* represented a negligible part of the *miri* land when compared to the land covered by *timars* and *zeamets*. But examination of the 16th century *defters* relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina shows a very rapid growth in the number of *çifliks* and underlines the principle differences of origin between the above mentioned group of 15th century *çifliks* and the multitude of 16th century ones. The first *çifliks* were assigned to some people as rewards for merit, on the initiative and by the explicit consent of the central administration, whereas innumerable *çifliks* from the 16th century appeared to be only an aspect of a spontaneous economic process which often had nothing to do with

the consciously directed initiative of the central authority and which, in fact, meant the decline and decay of the classical organization of the *timar* system.²⁴

It goes without saying that the process progressed with time, gaining in speed and dynamism. In the 17th century its growth was intensive enough to lead to a turning-point in the social position of spahis: in economic power and control of land they were almost outweighed by *çiflik* owners. The 18th and 19th centuries will bring along the absolute triumph of *çiflik* owners, so that the abolition of the *timar* system in 1839 will be but a formal act of liquidation of an obsolete organization, which was, with its empty exterior, covering the predominant form of ownership during the last centuries of Turkish rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The question is whether the "čiflučenje" in Bosnia and Herzegovina was an exceptional phenomenon originating from the special organization of the Turkish feudal system. In my opinion the answer to the question should be stated precisely. The *çiflik* considered as something qualitatively new in Ottoman agrarian relations is not a phenomenon characteristic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It springs by the nature of its development from the general character of agrarian relations in the Ottoman Empire. Considered in terms of numbers, however, the growth of the *çiflik* can be said to have had particularly favourable and specific circumstances for development in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The institution of *ocaklik timars* in Bosnia and Herzegovina – which is the subject of this paper – was also one of the most important elements influencing the course and power of its development. An important question in the problem of "čiflučenje" is who its main supporters were. It is quite natural that in those provinces of the Empire where the native *timar* owners were predominated over the newcomers, as was the case in Bosnia "čiflučenje" had to take different course and to have a different final result than in those provinces where such a stratum did not have a long continuous tradition, as in Serbia for example. In my opinion, at the time of the stabilization of Turkish rule Serbia took longer to establish and develop production labour than Bosnia and Herzegovina did, because Serbia, in the period critical for the course of development of the process of "čiflučenje", was experiencing deep economic and social stresses, migrations and discontinuances of Turkish rule. The Austrian administration in Serbia was a powerful blow to the process of "čiflučenje". I think that a detailed analysis of the 16th and 17th century *timar* system will show that the *timar* class in Serbia, in spite of the predominance of the Moslem spahi, never arrived at such unanimity and homogeneity as did the same class in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Regarding Macedonia, however, the process of "čiflučenje" took deep roots there, firstly, because of the growth of production which all

²⁴ "Pregled" (Survey), Sarajevo, 1953, No. 5, p. 386–393.

the time in the course of the 16th, 17th and the 18th centuries was being improved under the influence of well developed Mediterranean towns, Salonika in particular, and secondly, because of the powerful class of timar owners there.²⁵ That process, with respect to its exponents, nowhere had results equal to those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the class of *timar* owners was mostly represented by *çiflik* owners.

III

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OCAKLIK TIMARS (HERIDITARY FEUDAL FEES) IN BOSNIA

The crisis of the Ottoman *timar* system, starting as early as the 16th century, came to its full climax towards the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century. Some eminent Turkish authors of that time discussed the problem trying to find out the main causes of the decline of the Empire. Thus a Bosnian, Mula Hasan Kjfajija wrote his "Nizam-ul-alem", which means the world system or, in a less literal translation, the way of governing the country. This treatise of his was written in the last years of the 16th century.²⁶ At the beginning of the 17th century, in the reign of Ahmäd the First there appeared the paper "Kavanini Al-i Osman" i.e. the Laws of the Ottoman kind²⁷ by Ayni Ali. Murat the Fourth was presented Kocu-bey's treatise "Durer-i risale-i nizam-i devlet," that is A pearl among treatises on the system of governing,²⁸ and the famous Hacı Halife i.e. Katib Çelebi wrote the treatise "Destur-ul-amel li islah-il halel," meaning A Pattern of the procedure of removing difficulties.²⁹ Ali Çavus's famous dissertation written in 1653, belonging essentially to the same category of works, gives a survey of the system of the Ottoman Empire and of its institutions.³⁰ In this paper the author pays special attention to agrarian relations in the Empire. All these treatises except Ali Çavus's have something in common. Namely, for more than half a century they all point out the permanent decline of the Empire and try to find the main reasons for it. All the authors are in agreement on one point: the relationship between the two main classes — soldiers and peasants as producers — is dis-

²⁵ The Bitola *sicils*, kept in the National Archives in Skopje, offer valuable data on the development on the *timar* organization and establishment of *çifliks* in Macedonia. The oldest *sicil* from the year 1030 reckoned from the Hegira (1620-1) is followed by a series of these documents up to the end of Turkish rule in Macedonia.

²⁶ Archiv für slavische Philologie, No. 32, pp. 139-158.

²⁷ Istanbul issue of 1270 after the Hegira (1853/4).

²⁸ Istanbul issue of 1277 after the Hegira (1860/1).

²⁹ Istanbul issue of 1270 after the Hegira (1853/4).

³⁰ Issued by Hamid Hadžibegić in the Herald of the Regional Museum in Sarajevo, 1947. pp. 139-205.

turbed. The position of both classes as well as the economic and political situation in the Empire as a whole are getting worse and worse and more alarming. The *timar* organization is falling into decay and the fighting power of the spahi is decreasing. The taxes imposed on the peasantry are very heavy, yet the state treasuries are empty. Corruption, unscrupulousness and plundering reign everywhere in the Government administration. In this respect Kocu-bey's ideas are particularly interesting, because the only way out of all the difficulties, in his opinion, is the strengthening of the *timar* system, whose representatives should remain the fundamental military power of the Empire. Mentioning the so called *sepet timars*, i.e. the *timars* acquired in unlawful ways, the decrees for which are issued to fictitious persons, he concludes that the system is attacked by everybody and that its domains are plundered in all possible ways.³¹ He appeals to the authorities to restore the dignity and the financial power of the spahi and criticizes his miserable position. His *timar* acquired by the sword can at any time be seized and conveyed to a person who is unworthy of such a gift and who is of no use to the Empire.³² Obviously, he is an advocate of the inheritability of *timars* within the family.

Katib Çelebi comes to the interesting conclusion that the Turkish Empire, at the age of 364, is getting very old and that it can be compared to a body whose functions, disturbed because of age, are turning into very dangerous processes. Thus he pleads for thorough treatment of that body.

This poor state of the Empire matched the defeats in the sphere of military actions and foreign policy. The Empire exerted and spent all its strength in numerous and distant battlefields without any proper results, fearing the danger of a great European coalition, whose attack was supposed to come through the Balkan peninsula from the Adriatic Sea and Pannonia.

Great domestic tumults, janissary rebellions and the dethronement of the Sultan, riots in Asia Minor, Syria etc., endangered the Empire and made its leaders take measures for its recovery. One of the measures was the attempt of Ahmad the First to establish order in the field of legal affairs by a new law codification. It was in his reign that the central admin-

³¹ The mentioned dissertation, pp. 19–20. Valuable data on the *sepet timar* can be found in the Bitola *sicils*. Document No. 841 in the collection of documents of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo deals with *sepet timars* in Bosnia in the twenties of the 17th century.

³² Such a position often blunted the spahis' sense of class solidarity and turned them into malcontents united to the unconcealed enemies of the existing social system. Thus some spahis in Rumelia are in collusion with haiduks and even take part in their actions. *Mühimme-defters* from the second half of the 16th century give details on spahis' conspiracies with haiduks in Rumelia. Among these data there are some relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina. We do not mention Anatolia here, where social movements well enough illustrate this problem.

istration reached the decision to turn *timars* and *zeamets* in Bosnia and Hercegovina into hereditary feudal fees, aiming at the improvement of the very difficult situation in these provinces, where the feudal class in the long and hard struggle during the 16th century had made considerable efforts to contribute to the fame of the Empire. It is not by mere chance that the first severe criticism of the poor state of the Empire was written by a Bosnian, Hasan Kjafi. Just as the strength and splendour of the Empire during its most vigorous growth was, of all the Balkan provinces, best and most directly felt in Bosnia and Herzegovina because of its geographical position, so these countries were the first to suffer the consequences of a sudden turn of events for the worse and to witness the decline of the Empire. Kjafija drew his conclusions on the Empire just from the experience that Bosnia was undergoing, reminding the reigning circles of the dangers that were about to appear. He noticed the signs of decay and breakdown as early as the sixties but it was not until the end of the 16th century that he pointed them out. The unsuccessful wars in Hungary and the defeat at Sisak made him pronounce his judgement on the failures of the Empire. The movements of highland tribes, the dangerous diplomatic actions undertaken by the West among the Christians in the Balkans as well as the discontented spahis in Bosnia proved Kjafija right in his statements. In the 1604 uprising in Herzegovina, organized for secession from the Turks, there was among the Christian noblemen a Moslem spahi too. They signed a resolution in confirmation of their willingness to accept the supremacy of Austria.^{32a} At the beginning of the 17th century the Porte decided to send some deprived *valis* to Bosnia to resist this discontentment, but the decision was an unfortunate one. In addition to the fact that it was facing the danger of an uprising of Christian subjects and of foreign aggression, the Porte exposed itself to the risk not only of losing the support of the Bosnian spahis, but of making them enemies of the Empire. All this can be clearly seen from a document which informs us about when and how the institution of *ocaklik timars* was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This document is a firman written in the reign of Sultan Ibrahim (1640–1684). It is dated to the year 1054 reckoning from the Hegira, i.e. in 1644.³³ The firman says that the *vali* of Bosnia Husein-pasha sent a letter and *zeims* and *timar* holders wrote a petition to the Porte to tell it that Bosnia was a border area neighbouring Christians and that from the very beginning it had fought for the fame of the Empire regardless of sacrifices. It adds that just a short time before, on the occasion of the defence of Bu-

^{32a} Ćiro Truhelka, some recent letters of Bosnian Lords written in Bosnian alphabet, Herald of the Regional Museum in Sarajevo, XXVI, 1914, pp. 478, the document dated Jan. 19, 1604.

³³ The copy of that firman is in the codex No. 84 of the Oriental Archives of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb, pp. 139v – 140v.

dim and the fortresses in its area, the Bosnian spahis showed all their courage sacrificiting their lives and properties for the defence of the fortress in which they were beseiged. Besides, a large number of *zeims* and *timar* holders lost their lives in the same battle in which Hasan-pasha fell, fighting for the glory of the Empire. In order to be recompensed for their services their *zeamets* and *timars*, given to them by the grace of the sultan, were assigned to their sons and brothers by the imperial edicts issued by Ibrahim's father Ahmād the First (1603 – 1617) and Ibrahim's brothers Sultan Osman (1618 – 1622) and Sultan Murat the Fourth (1623 – 1640). The *timar* whose holder fell on the field of battle was, according to those edicts, assigned to his sons, brothers, or, in the absence of these, to the relatives belonging to his *ocak* (family). The assignment was made according to the testimony of *timar* holders and on the *alaybeyi's* request. In that way his *ocak* was preserved from being destroyed. *Zeims* and *timar* holders, being well disciplined and armed, served their emperor faithfully by taking part in wars and other services. But now – the firman runs on – the testimony of the *alaybeyi*, the *zeim* and *timar* holders and their suggestions are no longer taken into consideration. Contrary to the imperial orders vacant *zeamets* and *timars* are not intended for the former owner's sons and brothers but are assigned to people strange to the family. In some cases the deprivation is carried out contrary to the submitted data, thus the sons and brothers of the deceased spahi are left without the rent, their homes are destroyed and the military forces weakened and disorganized. All this is nothing but tyranny and injustice. Therefore Sultan Ibrahim declares again that these incidents are not his imperial will and issues this firman in confirmation of the full rights of spahis to preserve their *timars* in their *ocaks* (families). From now on let them conform to this firman and the former orders. In case of the death of a *zeim* or a *timar* holder let the vacant *zeamet* or *timar* be assigned by the *alaybeyi* and according to the testimony of *zeims* and *timar* holders to his sons and brothers, so as to maintain his *ocak*, and not to a stranger.

Before we undertake an analysis of this document we should point out that in the archives of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo as well as in the historical records of Gazi Husref-bey's Library there are many documents from the 18th and 19th centuries mentioning the institution of the *ocaklik timar* in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among them there is a series of the documents which, when taken together, give a complete illustration of the inheritance of *timars* and *zeamets* in certain families in the course of 100–150 years. It is notable that the smallest number of such documents originates from the 17th century. Those few that come down from the 17th century do not contradict the institution of the *ocaklik timar*, although some of them do not mention it expressly. We do not aim at presenting the empiricism of the problem of the *ocaklik timar* here but at

stating the fundamentally important points of that problem and drawing respective conclusions therefrom.³⁴

In the first place it is necessary to differentiate between the institution of the *ocaklik timar* in Bosnia, which was established at the beginning of the 17th century and lasted until its repeal in 1839, and the *ocaklik* estates that had existed in Anatolia ever since the Ottoman occupation. There they were called "yurtlik" estates, and were permanently assigned to the local feudal lords in return for their obedience and military service. That is what the Kurdish beys' estates were like. The beys were in possession of the edicts. In case the holder died or stopped carrying out certain of his duties, his yurt or ocak was assigned to his sons and relatives. Similarly, some tribal beys in Asia Minor were granted *yurtlik timars*. In case the bey died or could not perform his service, his *timar* together with his authority over the tribe was conveyed to his sons or cousins. Even in the case of lack of submissiveness to the central authority the mentioned *ocaklik* estates and *ocaklik timars* in Asia Minor were left to the family, whereas this was not the case with the *ocaklik timars* in Bosnia. There disloyal spahis were deprived of their *ocaklik timars*. Probably unaware of the difference, Hammer made the above mentioned comparison between Bosnian and Herzegovinian beys and Kurdish beys. However, those two institutions were established and developed under quite different circumstances. The Asia Minor *ocaklik* was a compromise between the *timar* system and the tribal organization, whereas the Bosnian *ocaklik* was meant to support the *timar* system's institution survival and the military strengthening of the province which was so precious to the Empire. Researches into the *timar* system in Bosnia show that even the first stage of its degeneration in the 16th century brought about usurpation of and trading in *timars*. The conquests made towards the end of the 16th and during the 17th centuries were too moderate to provide *mazuls* (deposed spahis) with new *timars*, not to mention the 18th and the 19th centuries when the danger of aggression from outside made spahis desperately defend what had been already acquired. Thus the *ocaklik* was the institution characteristic of that period of time when the *timar* system started being on the defensive. It is necessary to mention that the institution of *ocaklik timars* also comprised *gedik-timars*, which by being within the institution became hereditary estates. Skrić's "Register of Bosnian Spahis of the Year 1711", already mentioned here, shows convincingly that a considerable number of *timar* estates were in the possession of people of the Bosnian Divan, *cehayas*, *muteferiks*, *cavuses* etc. Those positions within the institution of *ocaklik timars* and *zeamets* were gradually conveyed to the Bosnian nobility, whose influence in the administration of the province was increased in that manner. The *timar* organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina was

³⁴ This analysis will be presented in our next paper which is in preparation.

getting more and more exclusive for people outside that *eyalet*. The term *mazul* was hardly heard on the occasion of granting *timars* in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁵ The estates started circulating within an exclusive circle of spahi families, and anyone outside that circle was considered to be a foreigner, or as was said in Turkish — *ecnebi*. Of course, that influenced the psychology of spahi families and created favourable condition for originating and consolidating a class tradition in the spahi order. The self-consciousness created by the awareness of the class of its part in the defence of the Empire is formulated in the term "odžaković" or "odžaković of the Bosnian border area." Nevertheless, up to now I have never come across claims by representatives of Bosnian *timar* beneficiaries that they had been the owners of their feudal fees before the conquest of Bosnia took place. The most often heard expressions are "from ancient times" or "from our grand-fathers and fathers."

However, before we present our conclusions on the importance and the scope of the institution of *ocaklik timars* in Bosnia from the economic point of view, it is necessary to say that new firmans issued by the central authority, which was too weak at the time, as well as common practice, kept broadening the conception of this institution. In the absence of sons and cousins sometimes distant relatives, who lived far away, appeared as heirs to *timars*. There was a logical rule by which the right to use the institution of the *ocaklik timar* was lost by a person who had another *timar* or held a rent of any kind, or by a person who, having left his class, started being engaged in a trade or some other economic activity, as well as by a person who declared not to care for such an inheritance. A *timar* could be inherited only through the edict held by the previous beneficiary and according to the evidence of a blood relationship with him. The whole procedure was under the control of representatives of the class, and in the case of serious disputes on the rights of inheritance there were significant meetings and deliberations in the Bosnian Divan in the presence of the *alay-beyui* of the *sancak* and the prominent *zeims* and spahis of the Bosnian *eyalet*. Analysis of the documents on *ocaklik timars* shows that the institution aimed mainly at protecting in the first place the integrity of the *timar*. Thus in all the relating documents the indivisibility of the *timar* is made a condition of the *ocaklik*, i.e. the *timar* appears to be and is treated as a feudal entirety with definite liabilities, regardless of the number of holders. Yet, there were cases with large *timars* — *zeamets* where the integrity of the feudal fee (*icmal*) was disturbed by the creation of another estate [in addition to the existing one]. It happened particularly if a *zeamet* was to be divided by inheritance into halves by two distant family branches, and if the problem was settled by making two *kilices*, i.e. two *timars*

³⁵ "Mülazim" is used instead in the meaning of a candidate for a *timar*. The term is used to refer to members of domestic spahi families.

out of one *kilic* – *zeamet*. A further change with relation to ordinary *timars* was that the sons of the deceased spahi, according to their number, could inherit the whole feudal fee regardless of the classical standards of inheritance. To some extent it was a sort of a compensation for *timar* holders. The land reserves that formed part of *timars* and *zeamets* were limited. There were no more conquests. New portions of cultivable soil were slowly conquered and mostly in circumstances of the predominance of *çiflik* owners. Only when a smaller feudal fee was left, according to the rules of the *ocaklik timar*, without an owner, the estate might be merged in a larger *timar* to enable the owner to aggrandize his property. If two persons held a feudal fee at the same time and if one of them died without having heirs, the rules of the *ocaklik timar* gave his participant the preference in inheriting him. We cannot give here an analysis of all the possible cases of partition and merger of *ocaklik timars* within one *ocak*, but we can conclude that a very active economic mobility of the *timar* estate was hidden behind all this, even if such was the case in the limited circle of a family *ocak*. In general, the well known classical formula "kasriyed" (renouncing of the feudal fee) is often met with in the legal documents on the *ocaklik timar*. Many a time it only served to disguise an economic transaction, i.e. selling or renouncing a feud in return for various benefits and favours. That formula "kasriyed", even in relation to *ecnebis*, that is to those who according to the regulations of the *ocaklik timar* had no right of inheritance, often contained an economic transaction which could have been carried out by the holder himself in case he had no heirs, or on behalf of his *ocak*, or more exactly by the participants in the ownership of his tenure. I have found several documents that drastically reveal the essence of kasriyed, containing the sums for which the stated *timars* were sold.³⁶ It gives us a supplementary explication of the essence of kasriyed in general in the *timar* system of the Ottoman Empire and points to surreptitious ways of trading in land, that is in tenures which could neither be bought nor mortgaged. In the later period when the power of the central administration was in decline and when the attitude of the spahi towards the *timar* had changed both in the economic sense and in respect of his disposing of it, it often happened that the mask was taken off and the reality was revealed as it actually was. It has already been mentioned that the institution of *mazul* was not possible in the *ocaklik timar* system, but, in my opinion, in the Turkish *timar* organization this institution also often served as a mask for economic transactions, for buying feuds by means

³⁶ In Sarajevo court register No. 2 from the year 964 after the Hegira (1556–7), kept in Gazi Husref-bey's Library in Sarajevo, there is a note (p. 330) that the *timar* holder Džafer, Hasan's son, had bought a *timar* from a spahi, by the name of Pervane and whose father's name was Abdullah, for 240 gold coins. Since the *timar* was assigned to somebody else Džafer asked the vendor to pay the money back to him. — For the later period see document No. 480 in the collection of documents of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo.

of the corruptible bureaucratic machinery. In Bosnia this phenomenon assumed a different form. As in Macedonia, about which information is available from Bitola *sicils*, the so called *sepet-timars* appeared in this province, too. A prominent person from the order of *timar* holders, *alaybeyi* for example, would amass from one to twenty small *timars*, which were left without owners, and by means of the corruptible bureaucracy would have the edicts made out to people from his suite or to some fictitious persons. He was impudent to such an extent that he often falsified the conditions concerning the inheritance of a *timar* in order to increase the list of his feuds.³⁷ The threatened spahi families fought desperately in defence of their rights by appealing to the established standards of the *ocaklik timar*.

In fact, at this period of time the fight over the *timar*, in my opinion, had the significance of a struggle for a more profound economic interest. Namely, it was the *timar* in the conditions of the *ocaklik* institution that offered its owner a better chance to compete for the surplus profit created by the rayah class (Christian peasant class). At that time, too, as at the previous stage of the *timar* system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were two ways to reach the goal: by "čiflučenje" and by the expansion of *hassa* land owned by the spahi, i.e. land within the *timar*, which, according to classical Ottoman legislation, was allotted to the spahi to be cultivated either by himself or by somebody else on his behalf. The expansion of *hassa* land or *beylik* land was much easier to undertake now, because the *timar* was in the permanent possession of the family, which made the ways in which the process took place more varied and more numerous and the economic benefit for the spahi and his *ocak* certain and obvious. It was not the case, however, with ordinary *timars*, since all the effort and the financial strain the spahi put into the increase of the *hassa* land would have been useless, if the *timar* was conveyed to another person. It was possible for the spahi to mask his flagrant attempts to expand the *hassa* land by relinquishing in collusion with a third person the best portion of the land of his *timar* to that person by his right of deed, and then to get it back through purchase for his wife, brother, cousins etc. Later on that repurchased land was tacitly added to his *hassa* land.³⁸ In such cases "čiflučenje" could coincide with the expanding of *hassa* land. There were other various sorts of machinations with *timars* to the same effect. The clue to the whole situation was in the right of deed, inherited from the classical Ottoman legislation on the *miri* land. The old, by practice established way of "čiflučenje" also enabled Bosnian spahis to take, in

³⁷ The former *alaybeyi* of the Herzegovinian *sancak*, for example, Ebu Bekir, seized 13 *timars* (see document No. 1377/1-2 in the collection of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo).

³⁸ Document No. 832 in the collection of documents of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo.

the conditions of the *ocaklik timar*, a greater part in the distribution of the surplus profit of the *rayah* class. Here again the right of deed played a decisive role. The solidarity of the representatives of the feudal class against all other participants in the fight became apparent. The fighting for control over the *timar* is quite understandable, since *timars* made the participation in the process of "čiflučenje" much easier. Several large families of the time became well-known for "čiflučenje". It is enough to mention the Bubićes, the Dženetićes and other families for illustration of the above assertion. Concrete analysis of their *zemets* and *çifliks* proves a close relation between the *ocaklik timar* and the process of "čiflučenje"³⁹ Therefore *spahis* guarded jealously their right of deed. Even when they sold the revenues of their *timars* on a short or long term they would reserve the right of deed for themselves. However, all the *spahis* and their families were not equally successful in the struggle over "čiflučenje". There were many decisive circumstances and moments that encouraged differentiation in the feudal class. Gradually *çiflik-sahibis* started outweighing *timar* holders. They exerted a strong pressure on the *spahis* that lagged behind in the struggle and in that way caused the class differentiation to become deeper. The significance of the *çiflik* is well seen from the fact that numerous *timars* in Bosnia were named after some *çifliks*. Skarić's Register of Bosnian *Spahis* of the Year 1711", confirms this. Certain documents on selling and buying land originating from the later period of Turkish rule also point out the predominance of *çiflik* owners. The documents bear witness that even the classical formulation of the deed paper is no longer respected. The purchase of land used to be made only under the direct control of *spahis* and only with their signature in the main text of the paper. Now the *spahi's* place in this process is taken over by the *çiflik-sahibi*, who by legalizing the classical form of the deed with his own signature gives the vendee a guarantee of undisturbed disposal of the land. It is only on a discreet margin of the paper that the *spahi's* name appears certifying his brief confirmation, made up of a sentence or two, of the act of the sale. There were cases when *spahis* had to make an *ahid-name* (a contract) with *ashabi alaka*, which in the complicated official language was the name for the aggressive *çiflik* holder who refused to pay the *spahi* his rent income, so that the *spahi* had to bargain with him about it and to fix the agreement by means of a contract.⁴⁰

It goes without saying that the fate of Christian *timars*, represented by small *knezes'* feuds with only few exceptions was sealed in the con-

³⁹ There are a great number of documents relating to both families in the collection of documents of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo. Gazi Husref-bey's Library also contains some relating to the Dženetićes.

⁴⁰ Document No. 4227 in the collection of documents of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo.

ditions of the existence of the *ocaklik* institution and the progress of "čiflučenje". The very stagnation of the *timar* system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the impossibility for feudal lords to increase the reserves of *timar* land, the furious race to seize as much of the surplus labour of the peasantry as possible through "čiflučenje" and "beglučenje" foredoomed knezes' *timars* to failure. Religion was also one of the moral motives for this. I have come across an interesting document from the period when the *timar* organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina no longer existed and when former *timar* holders were being given so called equivalent income in compensation for the abolished *timars*. The document deals with a Christian *timar* which is said to have been held by the family for generations. The *timar* yielded an income of 3,000 *akçes* and was in the Herzegovinian *sancak*, in the *nahiye* of Osanica. In the year 1234 A.H. (1819 A.D.) the *berats* and *tezkeres* relating to that *timar* were carried off by some bandits. As a consequence the holders were deprived of the *timar*. Dimitrije, son of Tomaš the descendant of the holders of the *timar*, possessing several *berats* and *ilâms* laid his claim on it. However, since in 1243 A.H. i.e. 1827/8 A.D. the Bosnian *Defterhane* was bunt down, no record concerning that *timar* could be found by the *vilâyet*. In 1260. A.H. i.e. 1844/5 A.D. a request was made to the Central *Defterhane* in Istanbul to ascertain whether Dimitrije's statements were true. But the data could not be found there, either. The document containing the data that I have reported here on the mentioned *timar* was dated 1286 A.H. i.e. 1859 A.D. Without discussing the very interesting fact that the *berat* was carried off and burnt down by bandits, who may have been both Christians and Moslems – which in either case does not disparage the importance of the event – I should like to point out by this exceptional example that the end of the Christian *timar* was imminent and that it was not recognized as such even long after the whole system had been abolished.⁴¹

The last years of Turkish rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina were marked by the absolute prevalance of *çifliks* over *timars*. The *timar* was of some value only if it was in the hands of rich *çiflik* owners, who at the same time usually had dominant positions in the administration and the army. Some families from Bosanska Krajina (the border area towards Austro-Hungary) who attained great power and respect at those times can serve as the best example of this. The Kulenovićes, for instance, acquired the position of captains, and some of their more important representatives even had the position of *miri* – *mîrans* of Kliški *sancak*, which, incidentally, after the unsuccessful wars with Austria and Venice, had been reduced to a half of its former territory. The powerful exponents of that family demanded, and were given, the *temlik-names* on their *çifliks* by the central administration. So a document from 1198 A.H. i.e. 1784/5 A.D. mentions

⁴¹ Document 2117 in the collection of documents of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo.

the *temlik-name* of the *çiflik* of Salih-pasha as well as the *temlik-name* issued in the name of his son Mahmud-pasha who was heir to his father's *çifliks*. Another document from the same year says that one of Mahmud-pasha's *cifliks* is taxed no less than 24,000 *akçes* for *filuri* lands. Although they were *zeamets* holders, the members of the family do not call themselves *zeims*, but use the title *ashabi çiflugan* i.e. *çiflik* holders. This did not prevent Mehmed Kulenović, captain of the fortress of Cisri Kebir (Kulen Vakuf), who acted as *spahi* of the *filuri* lands owned by the garrison of the fortress, from threatening the members of the garrison with dispossession of the estates they were cultivating unless they paid him a rent higher than that agreed to. On the other hand on Smail-bey Kulenović's *çiflik* in the village of Vodenica, among his *ciftcis* we come across the garrisons from the fortress of Kulen-vakuf.⁴² These several illustrations from the history of a powerful bey family are quite enough to show all the vehemence and complexity of the process by which ordinary *spahi* families attained the rank of a powerful aristocracy. They gained their names and power not so much by their social position as *spahis* as by their successful participation in the struggle for the surplus product of peasant labour. That process, as we have seen, often assumed the aspect of coarse physical force, unscrupulousness and plunder. The fact that it was the class of *timar* holders that benefitted to the utmost from that struggle can be attributed to a large extent to the institution of the *ocaklik timar*, which by its advantages favoured the compactness of that class and created favourable circumstances under which it could take part in the mentioned process. At the end of the process, which in fact meant the death of that class, the destiny of its various representatives was different, of course. While one part of the class turns into a powerful stratum of aristocracy, into *beys* and *ağas*, holders of *çifliks* and large portions of *beylik* land, others disappear in the mass of peasantry or go to the towns and engage in the urban economy, in trade and crafts. The respective data are available from the official papers of the time when, after the abolition of the *timar* system, the former *timar* owners or their descendants were paid a certain rent as the equivalent of the income of their former estates.⁴³ Those incomes were collected by the State and put into its treasury, and the mentioned equivalents were paid out through the so called *mâl-sandiks* which were in the *sancak* centre of the Bosnian *eyalet*.

State and put into its treasury, and the mentioned equivalents were paid out through the so called *mâl-sandiks* which were in the *sancak* centre of the Bosnian *eyalet*.

Thus the *timar* organization was abolished as an outmoded form of Turkish feudalism. But it was not the end of feudalism itself. It continued

⁴² Data taken from codex No. 79 in the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo.

⁴³ Data available in the collection of documents of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo.

to exist in the relationship between *çiftçis* and *çiftlik* holders. In my opinion it was a strange, hybrid form, born out of the specific conditions of the development of Ottoman feudalism. Just as commercial and usurious capital, which by their nature remain outside the production sphere, cannot bring about any essential changes in the social and economic structure of feudalism without their transition into the sphere of production since otherwise they keep reproducing the feudal relations, so the *çiftlik*, though essentially a form of the feudal organization of agrarian relations, has a hybrid character. On the one hand it deprives peasants of the right to possess land and leaves them in the role of the immediate producers who pay a fixed rent to *çiftlik* owners, and on the other hand it hides in itself a latent possibility of being turned into a capitalistic production system by the replacement of rent in kind by either monetary rent or by the hired labour of the landless peasant. However, it turned out that feudal agrarian production, as the production of a lower level, could not be turned by itself into a system of capitalistic production, since there was no domestic capitalistic market to act therein by the force of its laws. Consequently the *çiftlik*, as the organization of agrarian relations and agrarian production, remained a feudal institution, which reciprocally effected the underdeveloped economy of Turkish towns.

If we ask the question why after the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina there was an agrarian problem in the country, in other words, why neither *çiftlik-sahibis* nor *çiftçis* could adapt themselves to the new capitalistic relations that were being introduced at a rapid pace by Austro-Hungary, the answer is that "çiflučenje" was a long process and the *çiftlik* a rather old institution, which by its long economic and social life during the last centuries of Turkish feudal rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina had preserved and emphasized that side of its nature which gave it the character of a feudal institution. Here we do not think only of the strictly economic aspect of the process, but also of all those social, psychological, ideological, and cultural moments that enter the sphere of production labour and productin relations. The institution of the *çiftlik*, transmitted abruptly and without a gradual evolution into the system of capitalistic relation, had to appear as a rigid cell of feudal agrarian production, incapable of being fitted into the new capitalistic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That cell had to be destroyed to make it possible for agricultural production to function properly under the new circumstances. That is, the *çiftlik* land had to be given back to the immediate agricultural producers so as to fit it into the system of capitalistic relations.

R e z i m e

ODŽAKLUK TIMARI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

U ovom radu autor rezimira neke postavke iz svoje studije „Razvatak timarskog sistema u Bosni i Hercegovini”.

Autor smatra da se timarski sistem razvio u Bosni i Hercegovini na isti način kao i u drugim balkanskim zemljama. Prema njemu, Osmanlije su već imale potpuno razvijen timarski sistem u doba osvojenja Bosne i Hercegovine. Oni su u ovim krajevima primjenjivali na dosljedan način princip mirijske zemlje i u svoj feudalni sistem primali su predstavnike stare feudalne klase – naročito sitno plemstvo – bez razlike da li su oni bili islamizirani ili ne, uzimajući u obzir samo gore izloženi princip. Na taj način, tvrdnja prema kojoj je staro plemstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini sačuvalo svoje posjede i privilegije prihvatajući islam, predstavlja istorijsku zabludu.

Autor zatim razmatra problem porijekla i razvoja odžakluk timara u Bosni i Hercegovini. On podvlači važnost ove institucije za razvoj Bosne i Hercegovine pod osmanskom vlašću od XVII do XIX stoljeća, dokazujući kako je ta institucija pomogla stvaranju gore spomenute zablude. U vezi sa ova dva problema, autor razmatra pitanje čifluka u Bosni i Hercegovini izlažući svoj stav o tome.

Sva ova autorova razmišljanja zasnovana su na bogatim istorijskim izvorima čija će detaljna analiza biti data u studiji koju priprema.

S u m m a r y

ODŽAKLUK – TIMARS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In this paper the author summarizes some of the assumptions from his earlier study "Development of the Timar System in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (timar – feudal estate).

The author thinks that the timar system in Bosnia and Herzegovina had developed in the same way as in other Balkan countries. According to him the Ottomans had already had a developed timar system at the time of the conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In these regions they consistently applied the *miri-land* principle and they accepted into their feudal system representatives of the old feudal class – especially lower aristocracy – no matter whether they were islamized or not, taking into account nothing but the mentioned principle. Thus the assertion that the old aristocracy of Bosnia and Herzegovina retained their estates and privileges by converting into Islam is nothing but a historical mistake.

The author then deals with the question of the origin and development of odžakluk-timars in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He emphasizes the

importance of this institution for the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Ottoman rule from 17th till 19th, providing the proof for his assumption that this institution has caused the mistake mentioned above. In connecton with these two problems the author considers the question of *čifluk* in Bosnia and Herzegovina explaining his attitude.

All these reflections are based on numerous historical sources. The same author is working on their analysis at the moment.